Daniel Ortega

Banco de Desarrollo de America Latina (CAF) &
Instituto de Estudios Superiores
de Administracion
Centro de Politicas Publicas
Ave. IESA, Edif. IESA
San Bernardino, Caracas 1010

E-Mail: EmailAddress: hidden: you can email any NBER-related person as first underscore last at nber dot org
Institutional Affiliation: Instituto de Estudios Superior de Administracion

NBER Working Papers and Publications

October 2017Place-Based Interventions at Scale: The Direct and Spillover Effects of Policing and City Services on Crime
with Christopher Blattman, Donald Green, Santiago Tobón: w23941
Cities target police patrols and public services to control crime. What are the direct and spillover effects of such targeted state services? In 2016 the city of Bogotá, Colombia, experimented on an unprecedented scale. They randomly assigned 1,919 streets to either 8 months of doubled police patrols, greater municipal services, both, or neither. We study how crime responds to intensifying normal state presence in moderate- to high-crime streets, and what this implies about criminal behavior. Scale also brings challenges. Spatial spillovers in dense networks introduce bias and complicate variance estimation through “fuzzy clustering.” But a design-based approach and randomization inference produce valid hypothesis tests in such settings. We find that increasing state presence has modest di...
April 2009The Price of Political Opposition: Evidence from Venezuela's Maisanta
with Chang-Tai Hsieh, Edward Miguel, Francisco Rodriguez: w14923
In 2004, the Chávez regime in Venezuela distributed the list of several million voters whom had attempted to remove him from office throughout the government bureaucracy, allegedly to identify and punish these voters. We match the list of petition signers distributed by the government to household survey respondents to measure the economic effects of being identified as a Chavez political opponent. We find that voters who were identified as Chavez opponents experienced a 5 percent drop in earnings and a 1.5 percentage point drop in employment rates after the voter list was released. A back-of-the-envelope calculation suggests that the loss aggregate TFP from the misallocation of workers across jobs was substantial, on the order of 3 percent of GDP.

Published: Hsieh, Chang-Tai, Edward Miguel, Daniel Ortega, and Francisco Rodriguez. 2011. "The Price of Political Opposition: Evidence from Venezuela's Maisanta." American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, 3(2): 196-214. DOI: 10.1257/app.3.2.196 citation courtesy of

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